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ABSTRACT
This project investigates how changes in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)- level housing prices
affect household fertility decisions. Recognizing that housing is a major cost associated with child
rearing, and assuming that children are normal goods, we hypothesize that an increase in real estate
prices will have a negative price effect on current period fertility. This applies to both potential first-time
homeowners and current homeowners who might upgrade to a bigger house with the addition of a
child. On the other hand, for current homeowners, an increase in MSA-level house prices will increase
home equity, leading to a positive effect on birth rates. Controlling for MSA fixed effects, trends, and
time-varying conditions, our analysis finds that indeed, short-term increases in house prices lead to
a decline in births among non-owners and a net increase among owners. Our estimates suggest that
a $10,000 increase in house prices leads to a 2.1 percent increase in births among home owners, and
a 0.4 percent decrease among non-owners. At the mean U.S. home ownership rate, our estimates imply
that the net effect of a $10,000 increase in house prices is a 0.8 percent increase in births. Given underlying
differences in home ownership rates, the predicted net effect of house price changes varies across demographic
groups. Our paper provides evidence that homeowners use some of their increased housing wealth,
coming from increases in local area house prices, to fund their childbearing goals. In addition, we
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This project investigates how changes in Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)-level house
prices aﬀect household fertility decisions. The conceptual approach is based on an economic
model of fertility that recognizes that changes in house prices potentially have oﬀsetting
eﬀects on fertility. Assuming that children are normal goods, and recognizing that housing
is a major cost associated with (additional) children, an increase in the price of housing
will have a negative substitution eﬀect on the demand for children in the current period,
ceteris paribus. This is true for both potential ﬁrst-time homeowners (i.e., current renters
who would buy a house with the addition of a child) and current homeowners who might
buy a larger house with the addition of a child. On the other hand, for a homeowner, an
increase in MSA-level house prices increases home equity. This could lead to an increase
in birth rates among homeowners through two channels – a traditional wealth eﬀect and/or
an equity extraction eﬀect. In either case, when home prices increase, homeowners might
use some of their new housing equity to fund their childbearing goals. The net eﬀect of
house prices on aggregate birth rates will depend on individual’s responsiveness along these
margins and rates of home ownership.
We are interested in identifying the causal relationship between movements in local area
house prices and current period fertility decisions. Our main empirical analyses consist of
ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of MSA-demographic group level fertility rates on
MSA level house prices interacted with a baseline measure of MSA-group level home own-
ership rates, controlling for conditional variable main eﬀects, time-varying MSA conditions,
MSA ﬁxed eﬀects, and MSA-speciﬁc time trends. Our main analyses focus on the housing
price cycle of 1997 to 2006, a period of general housing price growth. Groups are deﬁned by
age and race/ethnicity. We use the county-level identiﬁers in the conﬁdential Vital Statistics
natality ﬁles to construct MSA level fertility rates, using MSA deﬁnitions that are consistent
with the MSA deﬁnitions in the federal housing dataset. Our main source of house price
2data is the Federal Housing Finance Agency House Price Index, which we use in combina-
tion with 2000 MSA-level median home values to generate house price levels over time. We
alternatively consider the Case-Shiller Index.
Conceptually, we are examining how short-term ﬂuctuations in house prices aﬀect current
period fertility decisions, all else equal. Our empirical analysis controls for time-varying
MSA-level economic conditions that potentially covary with real estate markets and also
fertility timing decisions, including the local area unemployment rate and measures of the
local wages. It is imperative that the regression speciﬁcation control for MSA ﬁxed eﬀects
so that the estimated relationship between house prices and birth rates is not confounded
by time-invariant diﬀerences in preferences for children across MSAs. If couples with lower
preferences for children sort into areas with higher costs of living – driven by other amenities
– there will be a negative correlation between house prices and fertility. Our estimated
relationship of interest will be net of any such sorting patterns. We add MSA-speciﬁc time
trends and MSA-ownership cell-speciﬁc time trends to the model to control for the possibility
that individuals with plans to increase or decrease their fertility move into MSAs with upward
or downward trending house prices, and that renters and owners behave diﬀerently in this
manner.
Results indicate that as the proportion of women in a demographic cell who are home
owners increases, an increase in house prices is conditionally associated with an increase in
current period fertility. This is consistent with a positive “home equity eﬀect” that dominates
any negative price eﬀect. The data also indicate that as the proportion of homeowners
approaches zero, an increase in MSA-level house prices leads to a decrease in current period
fertility, which is consistent with a negative price eﬀect among non-owners. In general,
the main results hold across race/ethnic groups and are equally driven by ﬁrst and high-
order births. These main results are statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful.
Employing our regression estimates in a straightforward simulation exercise, we ﬁnd that
a $10,000 increase in home prices is associated with a 2.1 percent increase in fertility rates
3among owners. For non-owners, we estimate a corresponding decrease in fertility rates of
0.4 percent. For an MSA, as home ownership rates increase from 10 to 20 percent, the net
eﬀect of a $10,000 increase in house prices becomes positive. Our simulations suggest that all
else held constant, the roughly $119,000 average increase in house prices during the housing
boom of 1997 to 2006 was associated with a 10 percent increase in births over that time.
We implement a number of robustness checks on the model speciﬁcation and sample con-
struction. We examine how the estimates compare across housing markets characterized by a
measure of housing supply elasticity. We also turn to individual-level data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to conﬁrm that the pattern of eﬀects we see in the aggregate data
is found at the individual-level in the ways expected. In addition, we estimate our model
on data from two housing bust periods, to see how the estimated relationships compare to
those estimated during the 1997-2006 housing boom period. And ﬁnally, we tabulate data
from the American Housing Survey (AHS) to see if home equity extraction - via mortgage
reﬁnancing or home equity loans/lines of credit - is a viable mechanism contributing to the
positive eﬀect of house price increases on fertility for home owners.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide an empirical examination of how ag-
gregate movements in house prices aﬀect aggregate level birth rates. First, as an issue of
economic demography, it is informative to understand how movements in the real estate mar-
ket aﬀect current period birth rates, overall and for various demographic subgroups. Second,
within the research literature on the nature of the demand for children, an examination of
the eﬀect of house prices on the fertility outcomes of homeowners constitutes a useful test
of wealth eﬀects. Third, our paper highlights the importance of including housing markets
in any model of how economic conditions aﬀect fertility outcomes. In fact, as an empirical
matter, we ﬁnd that changes in house prices exert a larger eﬀect on current period birth
rates than do changes in unemployment rates. Fourth, our results potentially speak to the
role of credit constraints, and imperfect capital markets, in aﬀecting the timing of fertility
decisions. This is an issue that features prominently in the literature on the cyclicality of
4fertility timing, as reviewed in Hotz, Klerman, and Willis (1997). Our ﬁnding of a positive
eﬀect among home owners suggests that some individuals may consume out of home equity
to fund their childbearing goals. And ﬁnally, there is a literature, described below, on the
tendency of individuals to consume out of housing wealth. To our knowledge, that literature
has not previously considered children as a potential “consumption” good in this regard.
Our results provide clear empirical support for the idea that house prices impact birth rates
in a statistically signiﬁcant and economically meaningful way.
2 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
There is a large literature in neoclassical economics investigating the nature and determi-
nants of fertility in developed countries. In the most simple static approach to this question,
parents are viewed as consumers who choose the quantity of children that maximizes their
lifetime utility subject to the price of children and the budget constraint that they face.
Children are conventionally thought to be normal goods, but an empirical puzzle presents
itself in both time series and cross-sectional data, which tend to show a negative correlation
between income and number of children.
There are two leading explanations for this observed correlation that maintain the basic
premise of children as normal goods: (1) the quantity/quality trade-oﬀ (Becker, 1960) and
(2) the cost of time hypothesis (Mincer (1963); Becker (1965)). The ﬁrst refers to the
observation that parents have preferences for both the quantity and quality of children. If
the income elasticity of demand for quality exceeds the income elasticity of demand for
number of children, then as income rises, parents will substitute away from the number of
children, toward quality per child. The second hypothesis attributes the observed negative
relationship between income and fertility to the higher cost of female time experienced by
higher income families, either because of increased female wage rates or because higher
household income raises the value of female time in non-market activities. There is a long
5and active literature that attempts to estimate the eﬀect of changes in family income and of
own-prices on fertility.1
There exists a closely related literature investigating the cyclicality of fertility, which is
a literature about fertility timing (e.g., Galbraith and Thomas (1941); Becker (1960); Silver
(1965); Ben-Porath (1973)). Changes in the unemployment rate are typically thought to
aﬀect the wages of women and their husbands. Under the standard assumption that women
bear the primary responsibility for child rearing, it becomes optimal for woman to select
into childbearing at times when their opportunity cost is lowest, that is, when economic
conditions are least favorable. Another consideration aﬀecting optimal timing with regard
to unemployment rates is skill depreciation (Happel, Hill, and Low, 1984).
In a world with imperfect capital markets and credit constraints, women might not
be able to optimally time fertility with regard to opportunity cost and skill depreciation
considerations. In particular, though some women might optimally choose to select into
childbearing during economic downturns, they might not be able to aﬀord to do this, if
husbands’ income is also negatively aﬀected. Schaller (2011) provides a recent examination
of this issue and explicitly considers the role of gender-speciﬁc labor market conditions. Her
results conﬁrm previous empirical ﬁndings that increases in overall unemployment rates are
associated with decreases in birth rates. In other words, her empirical work conﬁrms that
births are pro-cyclical. In support of the predictions of Becker’s time cost model, she further
ﬁnds that improved labor market conditions for men are associated with increases in fertility,
while improved labor market conditions for women have the opposite-signed eﬀect.2
In many respects, the context of real estate markets is more straightforward to consider
1The key empirical challenge in this literature is to ﬁnd variation that is exogenous to women’s (or
couple’s) preferences and that alter price or income without aﬀecting the opportunity cost of women’s time.
Many of these papers are reduced-form in nature, and include examinations, for example, of the eﬀect of
direct pro-natalist government payments (e.g., Milligan (2005); Cohen, Dehejia, and Romanov (2007)) and
of exogenous changes in income (Lindo (2010); Black et al. (2011)).
2Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) suggest that relatively more white women opt into childbearing during
economic downturns than black women; they attribute this diﬀerence to credit constraints facing blacks.
Neither Schaller (2011) nor we ﬁnd evidence in the data consistent with this idea. In particular, we ﬁnd a
larger negative relationship between unemployment rates and birth rates among whites than among blacks.
6conceptually because changes in house prices do not aﬀect the cost of parental time. Our
conceptual framework is thus not encumbered by considerations of skill depreciation or op-
portunity cost of time. We motivate our empirical model and interpret our estimated eﬀects
simply in terms of housing costs (which aﬀect the price of childbearing) and housing income
eﬀects (which aﬀect ability to consume in the current period).3 Our focus on current period
prices and contemporaneous fertility allows us to look separately for price and “income”
eﬀects. Changes in the real estate market are expected to generate price eﬀects because
housing costs are estimated as the greatest portion of the annual cost of raising a child:
greater than food, child care, or education (Lino, 2007).
We qualify the term “income” because an increase in house prices does not necessarily
imply increased wealth or income for home owners. If price increases are viewed to be
permanent and homeowners see their home as a store of wealth, an increase in house prices
can be thought of as an increase in (perceived) wealth for existing homeowners. This could
lead to an increase in the demand for children in the current period, as well as in a completed
lifetime setting. But, if homeowners do not intend to “cash out” and move to a lower-
priced real estate market during their lifetime, or if they view the increase in house prices as
transitory and expect it to be undone at a later period, there is no change in actual wealth or
permanent income. However, if homeowners are otherwise credit constrained but can liquefy
increases in home equity, there can be an increase in current period accessible income and this
could lead to an increase in current period birth rates. To the extent that equity extraction
is driving our results, our paper potentially speaks to the role that credit constraints play in
aﬀecting the timing of childbearing. For the sake of convenience of exposition, we refer to
this general class of explanations as a “home equity eﬀect”.
One could reasonably argue that in contrast to unemployment rates – which are generally
3There exists a class of dynamic or life-cycle models of fertility decisions, which recognize that changes
in prices and income over the life cycle may result in changes in the timing of childbearing, even if they do
not cause completed lifetime fertility to change. The Handbook chapter by Hotz et al. (1997) provides an
overview of these theoretical models. Heckman and Walker (1990) provides an empirical examination of the
eﬀect of income and wages on life-cycle fertility using data from Sweden.
7understood to be cyclical – movements in the housing market over the period we analyze
were likely to have been perceived at least in part as permanent. This would follow from the
observation that the national trend in housing prices between 1997 and 2006 was steadily
increasing. This suggests our results may be indicative of a change in completed fertility, as
opposed to simply a story about timing or cyclicality. We give a cursory treatment of this
possibility in our empirical analyses below - in particular by looking at higher-order births -
but we leave it to future research to thoroughly examine this possibility.
Finally, we acknowledge that we talk about fertility throughout the paper as though it
is a simple decision. Of course, fertility is a stochastic outcome, albeit one that is to a large
extent controllable by individual’s actions with regard to sexual activity, contraceptive use,
fertility treatments, and abortion. We recognize, however, that latent demand for fertility
timing will not be perfectly realized. Thus, any response we see of fertility to house prices
will be a muted reﬂection of a couple’s desired fertility response.
3 Data and Empirical Approach
The main empirical approach of this paper is to empirically relate MSA level fertility
rates to demeaned and de-trended MSA-level house prices, interacting house prices with a
baseline measure of group-level home ownership rates and controlling for time-varying MSA
level characteristics. The three main data requirements are (1) MSA-level fertility rates,
(2) MSA-level house prices, and (3) group-level home ownership rates. In this section we
describe our main data sources and brieﬂy describe how we construct the relevant variables.
Table 1 provides details on explanatory variables and associated data sources.
3.1 Data
Data on births come from the Vital Statistics Natality Files, years 1990 to 2007. Vital
statistics data contain birth certiﬁcate information for virtually every live birth that takes
8place in the United States. Vital statistics data identiﬁes the race/ethnicity, marital status,
age, and education of the mother, as well as some limited information about the baby’s
pregnancy conditions, and the baby’s health status at time of birth. These data do not
include information about home ownership status of the parent. For the purposes of matching
births to our explanatory variables, we create a ﬁle of conceptions for the years 1990 to 2006,
using information on the date of birth and length of gestation to identify year of conception.
We do this because in terms of the decision-making process, the most relevant decision is the
decision to get pregnant in a given time period. It is thus the economic conditions that exist
at the conception decision point that are relevant, as opposed to the economic conditions in
place at the time when the birth actually occurs (typically 40 weeks later.) To be precise,
our analysis sample is a sample of conceptions that result in live births in year t.
We construct MSA-year-group level fertility rates by aggregating births and female pop-
ulation counts to the MSA-year-group cell, where groups are deﬁned by the interaction of
race/ethnicity and age category. We deﬁne three mutually-exclusive race/ethnic groups:
Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, and Hispanic. We exclude other race/ethnicities
from the analysis. We deﬁne two age categories, 20-29 and 30-44. We applied for and
obtained access to conﬁdential natality ﬁles that identify the mother’s state and county of
residence. We obtained annual female population counts (by age, race, ethnicity, and county)
from the National Center for Health Statistics (National Center for Health Statistics, 2003
2010). We use these data to construct MSA-group-level fertility rates, deﬁned as the to-
tal number of births to women in the MSA-year-group cell divided by the MSA-year-group
population. To aggregate from counties to MSAs, we use the MSA deﬁnitions that are
used in the federal housing datasets: 5-digit MSAs and Divisions as deﬁned by the Oﬃce of
Management and Budget in December 2009 (Bulletin 10-02).
We identify a total of 384 MSAs in the birth records. We restrict our sample to MSAs
that have at least ﬁve births in every year-group cell, which leaves us with a sample of
9222 MSAs.4 When we further restrict the sample to those MSAs for which all explanatory
variables used in the baseline speciﬁcation are available, we are left with a sample of 163
MSAs.5
The main data source used to construct MSA-level house prices is the Federal Hous-
ing Finance Agency (FHFA) housing price index (HPI), previously known as the OFHEO
housing price index. The FHFA index is available for nearly all metropolitan areas in the
United States.6 It measures the movement of single family home prices by looking at repeat
mortgage transactions on homes with conforming, conventional mortgages purchased or se-
curitized through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since 1975.7 Since the index looks at repeat
mortgages of the same home, it is continually revised to reﬂect current MSA boundaries.
This is the reason we must use the most current deﬁnitions of MSAs in constructing the
birth data.
We use the FHFA index to construct real house prices for each MSA-year by combining
it with information on median home values obtained from the 2000 census. The 2000 Census
records median home values for each county in the U.S. We use the same county crosswalk
used to construct MSAs in the birth data to construct MSA-level median 2000 house values,
which are the population-weighted average across all counties in each MSA. Home values are
scaled by the relevant change in the FHFA index over time and are adjusted to 2006 dollars
using the CPI-U “All items less shelter” series. This measure serves as a proxy for real house
4Other empirical papers that have used aggregate level MSA data have used the following rules: Blau,
Kahn, and Waldfogel (2000) look at MSA level marriage rates and MSA level indicators of labor and marriage
market conditions. They use a rule of 20 observations per race-education group. Blau et al. (2004) look at
MSA level single motherhood and headship rates and welfare beneﬁts. They use a rule of 10 observations
per race-education group.
5While this process eliminates 58 percent of MSAs, it only eliminates about 17 percent of births.
6FHFA requires a metro area to have at least 1,000 transactions before it is published.
7Conventional mortgages are those that are neither insured nor guaranteed by the FHA, VA, or other
federal government entities. Mortgages on properties ﬁnanced by government-insured loans, such as FHA or
VA mortgages, are excluded from the HPI, as are properties with mortgages whose principal amount exceeds
the conforming loan limit. Mortgage transactions on condominiums, cooperatives, multi-unit properties, and
planned unit developments are also excluded. This contrasts to the alternative Case-Shiller index, which
includes all homes, but is only available for 37 states and a more limited set of MSAs. Additional diﬀerences
between the two indices are that the Case-Shiller index puts more weight on more expensive homes and the
Case-Shiller index uses purchases only, whereas the FHFA index also includes reﬁnance appraisals. As a
robustness check, we re-estimate our results using the Case-Shiller index.
10price movements of median value homes in each MSA.8
The third main variable we need to construct is a measure of mean group-level home
ownership rates at the MSA level. This is key to our analysis because conceptually, we
expect there to be heterogeneous responses of birth rates to home prices across groups
with diﬀerent rates of home ownership. Recall that Vital Statistics data do not include
information about home ownership status, so we can not separately tabulate current period
births (or conceptions) separately for home owners and non owners. Furthermore, we ideally
do not want to use an individual-level measure of realized home ownership rate, as that is
potentially endogenously determined with childbearing outcomes. Our implemented solution
is to use MSA-group level home ownership rates calculated from the 1990 5 percent sample
of the decennial census. As above, groups are deﬁned by race/ethnicity and age category.
We match the MSA deﬁnitions provided in the Census to the 2009 MSA deﬁnitions used
for the birth and housing price data according to the crosswalk procedure described in the
appendix. To be clear, our group-level measure of home ownership is taken at baseline and
is time invariant.
3.2 Descriptive statistics and trends
Figure 1 displays trends in mean (CPI adjusted) house prices, constructed as described
above, in our sample, both in levels (panel (a)) and yearly percentage changes between year
t − 1 and t (panel (b)). Figure 1 also displays house prices alternatively constructed using
the Case-Shiller Index to scale 2000 median home prices. The three housing cycles that fall
within our period of study are highlighted: the 1990-96 period of price decline, the 1997-
2006 housing boom, and the subsequent 2007-2010 housing bust. Appendix Table 1 lists the
163 MSAs included in our analysis sample, ranked according to the percentage increase in
housing prices between 1997 and 2006. The table also lists the computed median home price
in 2006 and the fertility rate in 2006. The top eight ranking MSAs/MSADs in terms of the
8This is the same procedure used by Glaeser et al. (2008).
11percent change during the boom cycle are all in California. Among the top 24 ranked, 16 are
in California, 7 are in Florida, and the remaining one is in New York. The most expensive
housing market in the nation is the San Francisco MSA, with a 2006 median home price of
$781,891. The MSAs with the least house price growth during this boom cycle are Dayton,
OH (3.92 percent), Fort Wayne, IN (3.27 percent), and Springﬁeld, IL (1.19 percent).
Figure 2 displays the time-series correlation between fertility rates and house prices and
then between fertility rates and unemployment rates, for the period 1990-2006, averaged
across the MSAs in our sample. These plots suggest that movements in fertility rates track
movements in house prices fairly closely, particularly in more recent periods. In fact, a
comparison of the graphs reveals that the time-series correlation between aggregate fertility
rates and housing prices is much greater than it is between aggregate fertility rates and
unemployment rates, .85 versus -.04 This provides a prima facie case for the importance of
considering housing prices when investigating how economic conditions aﬀect current period
birth rates.
Table 2 provides summary statistics from the 1997-2006 Vital Statistics natality ﬁles
and the 1990/2000 Census. These data are used collectively in various analyses presented
below. All measures are population weighted. The ﬁrst three columns summarize the main
dependent variable of interest: fertility rates (group-level births per 1000 women age 20-44),
overall and for ﬁrst and higher parity births. The overall fertility rate in our sample is 70.2
births per 1000 women aged 20-44. The highest fertility rates are found among Hispanics age
20-29: 154 births per 1000 women. The lowest rate is among Black mothers age 30-44:37.7
births per 1000 women.
The next column summarizes data from the 1990 census on MSA-group level home own-
ership rates. The overall home ownership rate among our sample of women age 20-44 is 44
percent. The highest home-ownership rates are found among older (age 30-44) white women,
who have an ownership rate of 68 percent. The lowest rates are found among younger (age
20-29) Black women, whose ownership rate is on average 10 percent. This indicates there is
12substantial variation across groups in rates of ownership. For the sake of comparison, the
next column shows the rates as calculated from the 2000 census. Comparing the group-level
ownership rates in 1990 and 2000 we see that home ownership rates are extremely stable
over this time period. The ﬁnal column displays the range of the 1990 ownership rate across
MSAs, for each group. These numbers indicate that in addition to the substantial variation
across groups in rates of home ownership, there is also substantial variation within groups
across MSAs.
3.3 Empirical Speciﬁcation
Our main empirical analysis consists of ordinary-least squares regressions (OLS) at the
MSA-group-year level. For our baseline analysis, we restrict our attention to the housing
cycle of 1997-2006. This facilitates interpretation as the period was one of nearly uniform
house price growth, and is recognized by the real estate literature as a housing boom period.
We will subsequently consider two housing bust periods: the early 1990s bust period (1990-
1996) and the post-2006 housing bust (2007-2010).
We estimate regression models of the following form:
ln(FertRatemtg) = β0 + β1(HousePricesmt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg) + β2HousePricesmt−1
+β3OwnRatemg + β4Xmt−1 + FracCollmgt + γm + γt + γg
+γm ∗ (t − 1) + γm ∗ OwnCatmg ∗ (t − 1) + mgt
(1)
The level of analysis is an MSA-year-group cell. In the above equation, the subscript m
denotes MSA division, t denotes year of the birth (where t-1 refers to the year of concep-
tion), and g denotes group.9 There are six groups, deﬁned by the interaction of our three
race/ethnic groups (non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Hispanic) and two age cat-
egories (age 20-29 and age30-44). Our ﬁnal analysis sample consists of 9,780 observations
9For the sake of convenience, we write t-1, but our empirical analysis is precise in dating the year of
conception by taking the date of birth and subtracting oﬀ the reported weeks of gestation.
13(10 years * 6 groups * 163 MSAs). All regression are weighted by the total number of births
in each cell.10
The coeﬃcients of primary interest are β1 and β2 , which capture the conditional eﬀect,
respectively, of MSA-year house price index (HPI) interacted with a baseline measure of
MSA-group-level ownership rates and the conditional main eﬀect of the MSA-year house
prices (HousePricemt−1) on fertility rates. The former indicates how an increase in home
ownership rates aﬀects the relationship between de-meaned, de-trended MSA house prices
and births. The conditional main eﬀect of HousePricemt−1 indicates how movements in
house prices aﬀect fertility rates net of ownership interactions, all else held constant. We
interpret this to be the conditional relationship between HousePricemt−1 and log fertility
rates among a non-home-owning population of households.
The variable OwnRatemg is the MSA-group level home ownership rate measured in the
1990 5-percent sample of the decennial census. This measure is taken at baseline to minimize
concerns about the endogeneity of year-speciﬁc MSA-home ownership rates and year-speciﬁc
MSA-fertility rates. Taking a baseline measure of home ownership rates for a group is
therefore preferable. As reported in Table 2, there is considerable heterogeneity across
groups in home ownership rates, as well as heterogeneity within groups across MSAs. It is
also true that home ownership rates are quite stable over time within groups, which means the
baseline measure is highly predictive of current period home ownership rates. Therefore, this
approach does not entirely eliminate any concern about endogenously determined current
period births and our measure of home ownership rates. We control for this conditional
main eﬀect to facilitate a causal interpretation of β1, but we are careful not to assign a
causal interpretation to the coeﬃcient on ownership rates.
We are interested in identifying the causal relationship between lagged house prices and
fertility rates. It is thus important to control for other time-varying MSA-level economic
conditions that potentially covary with real estate markets and also fertility timing decisions.
10Results alternatively weighting by total female population in each cell are similar and available from the
authors upon request.
14Our regression speciﬁcation includes controls for MSA-year unemployment rate, MSA-year
male wages included in the vector Xmt in equation (1). The speciﬁcation also controls for
FracCollmgt, the fraction college educated in each MSA-group-year. This is calculated as a
three year moving average using data from the Current Population Survey. Data on MSA-
year level unemployment rates come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Local Area
Unemployment Statistics. Our measure of MSA-year level male wages is the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentile male wage, which was calculated by MSA and year in the Current Population
Survey. Percentiles of the wage distribution were constructed based on hourly earnings for
full-time, full-year male workers.11 Unemployment rates were collected at the county level
and aggregated to MSAs using the crosswalk procedure described in the appendix. The
wage and fraction college measures were calculated using the MSA deﬁnitions available in
the CPS and translated to 2009 MSAD deﬁnitions using the crosswalk procedure.
The regression also includes controls for MSA ﬁxed eﬀects (γm), year ﬁxed eﬀects (γt),
group ﬁxed eﬀects (γg), MSA-speciﬁc time trends (γm ∗ (t − 1)) and MSA-ownership-cell-
speciﬁc time trends (γm∗OwnCatmg∗(t−1)). It is imperative that the regression speciﬁcation
control for MSA ﬁxed eﬀects so that the estimated relationship between house prices and
birth rates is not confounded by time-invariant diﬀerences in preferences for children across
MSAs. If couples with lower preferences for children sort into areas with higher costs of
living – driven by other amenities – there will be a negative correlation between house prices
and fertility.12 Given our goals in this paper, we want to isolate the eﬀect of house prices on
11We construct wages as in Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008). We deﬁne full time as 35 or more hours per
work, and full year as 40 or more weeks worked in the past year. We drop individuals who make less than
one half the 2006 minimum wage (in 2006 dollars). Top-coded observations are multiplied by 1.5.
12For example, consider the hypothetical case of two couples, in which one moves to San Francisco, where
household expenses are high, because they expect to have few children and spend their time and money
instead indulging in city-type amenities. The other couple moves to Wichita, in expectation of buying a
big house at a much lower cost per square foot, and ﬁlling it with kids. If these couples are typical, then
high-latent-fertility couples will sort into lower priced real estate markets and low-latent-fertility couples will
sort into lower priced real estate.Simon and Tamura (2008) examine the cross-sectional relationship between
fertility and the price of living space across U.S. metropolitan areas, as captured by the average rent per
room in an urban area (calculated among renting households.) Their baseline speciﬁcation, which controls
for region eﬀects and demographic composition, suggests that a one percent increase in rent is associated
with 0.16 fewer children per household.
15current period fertility net of these sorting patterns. It is thus important that our regressions
control for mean MSA-level diﬀerences in birth rates. The resulting regression estimate of
the relationship between house prices and birth rates is identiﬁed oﬀ within-MSA changes in
house prices. We add MSA speciﬁc time trends to the model to control for the possibility that
individuals with plans to increase or decrease their fertility move into MSAs with upward
or downward trending house prices. If there exist trends of this kind that are distinct for
groups with high and low ownership rates, our estimated β1 might be a biased estimate of
the conditional causal eﬀect of interest. We thus allow for separate MSA speciﬁc time trends
based on whether a group’s level of ownership is above or below the median, yielding two
values of OwnCatmg. So, for example, this allows for white women age 30-44 in the Boston
metro area to be on a diﬀerent trend then black women age 20-29 in the Boston metro area.
As noted above, our empirical analysis is designed to capture current period fertility
responses to movements in local house prices. Certainly it would be interesting to know
whether any short term responses observed translate into changes in completed fertility. To
the extent that we observe a change in higher-order births, we can speculate that those
changes reﬂect changes in total completed fertility. But, we leave it to future research to
carefully consider the lifetime implications of any short term changes that we ﬁnd. Such an
analysis requires a diﬀerent empirical framework.13
4 Estimation results
4.1 Main speciﬁcations
Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1). Column 1 reports the results with all
ﬁxed eﬀects included, but without MSA-speciﬁc trends or controls for labor market condi-
13In future work we plan to compare the completed fertility of cohorts who experienced their prime
childbearing years during diﬀerent real estate market realizations, controlling econometrically for diﬀerences
in wage levels and income over those periods. In such an approach, given that the empirical analysis is
no longer about a point in time, one needs to grapple with the issue of mobility over the course of one’s
childbearing years, which is not observed in most datasets.
16tions. This sparse speciﬁcation yields a point estimate of β1 of 0.00437 and a point estimate
on β2 of -0.00124, both statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent level. The positive and
statistically signiﬁcant point estimate on the interaction term HousePricemt−1∗OwnRatemg
indicates that as home ownership rates increase, higher house prices lead to an increase in
current period births, all else held constant. This implies that a positive home wealth eﬀect
dominates any negative price eﬀect among current home owners. The negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant point estimate on HousePricemt−1 is consistent with a negative price
eﬀect of house prices on current period fertility for non-home owners. Column 2 adds the
unemployment rate, Column 3 adds wage measures, and Column 4 includes both the un-
employment and the wage measures. The main point estimates of interest are qualitatively
unchanged. Looking at other explanatory variables, we see that the estimated coeﬃcient on
the mean ownership rate is positive, but statistically insigniﬁcant. As noted above, we do
not propose a causal interpretation to this relationship. The unemployment rate is found
to be negatively related to the fertility rate in all speciﬁcations, but it does not enter with
statistical signiﬁcance
Columns 5 and 6 report the results with MSA speciﬁc linear trends and MSA speciﬁc
quadratic trends, respectively. The pattern remains the same – a positive coeﬃcient on
HousePricemt−1∗OwnRatemg and a negative coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1– and the mag-
nitudes of the coeﬃcients are similar. The inclusion of quadratic trends demands a lot of the
data and does not alter our main estimates; hence we do not include quadratic trends in our
preferred speciﬁcation. However, we do maintain distinct MSA-speciﬁc trends for cells with
ownership rates above and below the median home ownership rate. As reported in Column 8,
these trends do aﬀect the point estimates of interest. In this model, the estimated coeﬃcient
on the HousePricemt−1∗OwnRatemg interaction is 0.0247 (with a standard error of .00373)
and the estimated coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 is -0.00411 (standard error of .00164).14
14As described earlier, these estimates are weighted by the total number of births in each cell. If we
alternatively weight by total female population in each cell we obtain an estimate of 0.0288 with a standard
error of 0.00412 on the interaction term and an estimate of -0.0077 with a standard error of 0.0018 on the
main eﬀect.
17We take this to be our preferred speciﬁcation. These estimates suggest that if house prices
increase by $10,000, as we move from an MSA-group with an ownership rate of 0 to a cell
with an ownership rate of 1, there would be a relative increase of 2.5% in fertility rates. More
usefully, if house prices increase by $10,000, comparing MSA-groups with ownership rates
of 0.25 to those with ownership rates of 0.75, we would see a relative increase of 1.25% in
fertility rates. We put these numbers into context below with the use of simulation exercises.
4.2 Alternate Measures of Home Prices
In this section we consider how our estimates change if we replace the house price in the
year of conception with alternative measures of house prices. We do not have a strong a
priori reason to believe that house prices in the year of conception is the most relevant
measure, as opposed to, say, house prices averaged over the three years prior. It may be the
case that couple’s fertility decisions are based on a longer time horizon or on longer terms
averages. Table 4 reports the results of estimating alternative models of this sort. Columns
1-4 use house prices in the years 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively, prior to conception. Columns
5, 6, and 7 use the 3-year moving average of house prices over the two, three, and four
years, respectively, prior to conception. In all of these seven alternative models, the familiar
pattern emerges of a positive coeﬃcient on the interaction between HousePricemt−1 and
OwnRatemgand a negative coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1. Results are within a reasonable
range of magnitudes – with the point estimates of β1 ranging from 0.0025 to 0.0045 – giving
us no reason to prefer one of these speciﬁcations over our baseline speciﬁcation.
In column 9 of Table 4, we consider computing the measure of house prices using an
alternative housing price index, the Case-Shiller Index. This index diﬀers from the FHFA
index used above in a few ways. As compared to the FHFA index, which is available for
all MSAs, the Case-Shiller index is only available for 20 metropolitan areas, which we are
able to match to 27 of the metropolitan divisions we use in the main analysis.15 However,
15See the data appendix for how we match the Case-Shiller index to the rest of our data.
18the Case-Shiller index oﬀers the beneﬁt of being constructed using virtually all homes in the
MSAs it covers, whereas the FHFA index only includes homes purchased or reﬁnanced using
conventional, conforming mortgages. In addition, the Case-Shiller index is value-weighted,
meaning more expensive homes ﬁgure more heavily in its construction, and it only includes
purchases, whereas the FHFA index includes purchases and reﬁnances. In column (8) we
show the results using the FHFA index home price data on the Case-Shiller sample MSAs
and in column (9) we use the Case-Shiller index home price data. Even though the indices are
slightly diﬀerent and the sample size is limited by using the Case-Shiller index, the pattern
of the coeﬃcients is familiar and the results moving from (8) to (9) are similar, conﬁrming
the results are not sensitive to the chosen housing price index.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In this section we estimate alternative speciﬁcations to equation (1) above, providing some
robustness checks on the main MSA-group level analysis. Table 5 reports these results.
Column 1 reproduces the main results from Table 3, for the sake of comparison. First we
consider alternate measures of the labor market conditions. In column 2 we replace male
wages with separate measures of male and female wages. In Column 3 we replace the wage
distribution measures with the mean wage. In column 4 we replace the wage distribution
measures with a measure of Income per Capita collected from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) regional economic accounts. To create this variable at the MSA-year level,
we employ our crosswalk procedure described in the appendix. Income included in this
measure includes all wage and salary income as well as supplements to wages and salaries,
proprietors’ income with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments, rental
income of persons with capital consumption adjustment, personal dividend income, personal
interest income, and personal current transfer receipts, less contributions for government
social insurance. In each case, the coeﬃcients are virtually unchanged.
19Next, we consider that owners and non-owners might be diﬀerentially aﬀected by general
economic conditions in a way that is not captured by simply including a measure of wages.
If this were the case, the coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg might capture this
diﬀerence, leading to a biased estimate of the causal eﬀect of interest. To do this, we interact
the home-ownership rate with the wage measures. Column 5 displays the results of this exer-
cise. The coeﬃcient on 75thWagemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,
indicating owner’s fertility decisions are positively eﬀected by increases in male wages at
the top of the distribution. However, the coeﬃcients on HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and
HousePricesmt−1 remain unaﬀected.
Next, we add a control variable for average rental prices in the MSA-year. Average rental
prices and house prices tend to covary, but there are years during which the two series are
more or less closely aligned. Our measure of average rental prices comes from the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Fair Market Rents program, used for the purpose
of calculating rent for the Section 8 housing assistance payment program.16 We adjust the
nominal values of rental prices to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U “all items less shelter” series
(as we do for the HPI). As shown in the table, the inclusion of this control variable does not
appreciably change the estimated coeﬃcients on our two explanatory variables of interest:
HousePricemt−1 and HousPricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg.
Finally, in column 7 of table 5 we consider an alternative sample of MSAs to check
on whether the changing boundaries of MSAs over the sample period is inﬂuencing our
estimates. We re-estimate the speciﬁcations reported in Table 4 using a restricted set of
MSAs. In particular, we limit the sample to MSAs whose boundaries did not change between
1990 and 2009. This is done as a check on the sensitivity of our estimates to the crosswalk
procedure we have used to link current MSAs (2009 OMB deﬁnitions) to vintage MSAs (1983
OMB deﬁnitions) which we use to match the group level home ownership rates to the rest of
16Calculated rent is inclusive of utilities and is typically calculated at the 40th percentile of the rent
distribution by number of bedrooms. Prior to 1995, rent was calculated at the 45th percentile. Some cities
are calculated at the 50th percentile. We take the unweighted average of the reported fair market rental
value for zero to four bedroom units as the average rental price in a given city.
20the data. This procedure eﬀectively ignores boundary changes that have occurred over our
sample period. Though the sample size is reduced, the range of point estimates on the two
coeﬃcients of primary interest is not qualitatively altered.
4.4 Diﬀerent Demographic Groups
In Table 6, we report the results of estimating equation (1) for various demographic subgroups
and for ﬁrst and higher order births. Column 2 reports the results for non-Hispanic whites,
column 3 reports the results for non-Hispanic blacks and column 4 reports the results for
Hispanic whites. The point estimate on the interaction term HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg
is always positive, implying a net positive eﬀect of house price increases among home owners
across all groups. The estimated magnitude of this relationship is largest for blacks and
smallest for Hispanics. The estimated coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 is negative for whites
and blacks, but positive for Hispanics. This last coeﬃcient is puzzling. For both blacks and
Hispanics, the estimated coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 ∗OwnRatemg and HousePricemt−1
are statistically diﬀerent from the estimated coeﬃcient for whites.
We next consider whether the eﬀects of house prices on current period births are driven
by ﬁrst births or higher order births. It is not clear a priori which would be more price or
income elastic. On the one hand, the optimal timing of ﬁrst births might be less constrained,
since mothers tend to be younger and might consider that a deliberate delay will be less
consequential, as they have more childbearing years ahead of them. Also, if couples have
speciﬁc ideas about optimal spacing, they might be more ﬂexible about the timing of their
ﬁrst birth. On the other hand, subsequent births might be more “marginal” and thus might
exhibit a great degree of elasticity with respect to price or a wealth shock. An additional
motivation for this analysis is that an eﬀect on higher order births might be indicative of a
change in completed fertility.
Table 9 columns 6 and 7 report the results. For both ﬁrst and higher parity births,
21the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction between HousePricemt−1 and ownership rate
is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, with very similar magnitudes: 0.00226 and 0.00261,
respectively. The point estimate for the coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 is negative and
statistically signiﬁcant for both ﬁrst and higher-order births. The ﬁnding of an eﬀect on
both ﬁrst and higher-order births is potentially informative about the nature of the eﬀects
we are estimating. Increases in ﬁrst births might reasonably be interpreted as a change in
timing, while changes in higher order births might reasonably be interpreted as an increase
in the total number of children. These interpretations are merely speculative, and warrant
further investigation.
Given that a previous literature exists on the relationship between unemployment rates
and contemporaneous fertility rates, it is interesting to consider the estimated coeﬃcients
on the unemployment rate. Our regression models yield statistically signiﬁcant negative
estimates of the relationship between unemployment rates and fertility rates among whites
and Hispanics, but not among blacks. When house prices are not included in the model (not
shown in the table), the estimated relationship is largely unchanged for whites (a statistically
signiﬁcant -0.0067), but it becomes attenuated and statistically insigniﬁcant for Hispanics.
(The point estimate is largely unchanged for blacks and remains statistically insigniﬁcant.) It
is also interesting to note that in terms of separate eﬀects by birth parity, the unemployment
rate is negatively related to ﬁrst births, but not discernibly related to higher-order births.
This would be consistent with the unemployment rate having an eﬀect on the timing of
childbearing initiation, but potentially not with completed fertility. To the extent that this
interpretation is warranted, this is an interesting contrast to the potentially more permanent
eﬀect of house prices. Again, we think these considerations deserve further examination,
although it is outside the scope of this paper.
225 Extensions
In this section, we undertake three extensions to previous analyses. First, we consider
variation across diﬀerent types of housing markets. Second, we conﬁrm that the aggregate
results hold at the individual level. And ﬁnally, we consider periods of declining house prices.
5.1 Comparisons by Local Housing Supply Elasticity and “Sand”
versus “Coastal” MSAs
The main threat to assigning a causal interpretation to the estimated β1 is the possibility
of reverse causality. This alternative interpretation holds that house prices are driven up in
places with relatively higher rates of home ownership (as measured in a pre-period baseline
year) by households who intend of conceive a baby in the coming year. This confounding
story is one of fertility-preference demand driven price changes. Recall that we ﬁnd that the
estimated conditional relationship between house prices and birth rates is negative, but the
interaction with ownership is positive. For this ﬁnding to be explained by the alternative
reverse causality story, it must be the case that fertility-related demand pressures occur
disproportionately in areas with higher rates of home ownership. This is not inconceivable,
but we would be more concerned if we didn’t ﬁnd separating eﬀects for the conditional
main eﬀect and the interaction term. If it were simply the case that in MSAs where people
demanded more children house prices got driven up, ceteris paribus, then both β1and β2
would be estimated to be positive.
We would clearly prefer to have an observable variable that could explain or predict these
shorter term price changes that our analysis exploits. To that end, we have attempted to ﬁnd
a suitable instrumental variable. Our review of the relevant literature on housing markets
has led us to a consideration of supply side constraint measures. The housing literature has
produced three common measures of supply constraints: the Rappaport and Sachs (2003)
status as a Coastal market based on a threshold distance to an ocean, the Gulf Coast, or a
23Great Lake; the Saiz (2008) calculation of the fraction of land lost to steep slopes and water;
and the Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index created by Gyourko et al. (2008).
Saiz (2012) has produced estimates of housing supply elasticity for 95 MSAs based on non-
linear combinations of both the Saiz (2008) geographic limitations and the Regulation Index.
Saiz clearly notes that this elasticity measure predicts long-frequency house price volatility,
not high-frequency changes; in particular, he focuses on the house price growth from 1970 to
2000.17 We are thus left without a feasible instrumental variable strategy. However, we do
make use of these concepts as way to compare locations which are expected to potentially
have demand driven price growth and those that are not.
We propose that concerns about fertility-preference demand driven price changes are less
likely to be a concern in places with lower housing supply constraints. We thus estimate
our regression models separately for MSAs with higher and lower levels of supply elasticity,
as captured by the Saiz (2012) measure. If the estimated relationship is maintained in less
supply constrained places, we are more conﬁdent in the assumption that our estimated eﬀect
is not driven by homeowners with babies (or fertility intentions) bidding up the prices of
inelastically supplied houses. Table 7 reports the results. Column 1 reports the results for the
sample of MSAs with supply elasticity below the median and column 2 above the median. In
fact, moving from column 1 to 2, the estimated coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1∗OwnRatemg
increases, as does the conditional main eﬀect of HousePricemt−1. This is opposite of what
would be expected under the reverse causality scenario. Columns 3 and 4 display the results
for the ﬁrst and fourth quartile of the elasticity distribution, respectively. Again, the results
on the elastically supplied MSAs are the largest. This suggests reverse causality is not likely
to be driving results.
An alternative strategy addresses the potential concern that markets with relatively high
17Mian and Suﬁ (2009) use the Saiz (2008) elasticity estimates to instrument for house price changes over
the period 2000 to 2005. We have experimented with using this measure interacted with year ﬁxed eﬀects or
with an annual measure of interest rates as an instrumental variable for MSA by year house prices, but its
ﬁrst stage predictive relationship with house price changes varies depending on the years selected; for some
periods it is positively related with house price changes, for others negatively, and the magnitudes ﬂuctuate
widely. In other words, its relationship with short-term house price changes is not stable.
24and low elasticities are not comparable in terms of the price changes they experienced during
the 1997-2006 housing cycle. To address this concern, we also look speciﬁcally at a set of
MSAs shown to have experienced large price increases despite their relatively high level of
supply elasticity – MSAs in the “Sand States” of Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada,
as identiﬁed by Davidoﬀ (2012). If the estimated empirical relationships of interest are
maintained in the “Sand States”, that would further boost our conﬁdence in the assumption
that our estimated eﬀect is not contaminated by reverse causality (i.e., homeowners with
fertility intentions bidding up the prices of inelastically supplied houses). The ﬁfth column
of Table 7 displays these results. Although the sample of sand only MSAs limits us to just
8 MSAs, the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction term remains statistically signiﬁcant. As
a comparison, in column 6 we also show the historically supply-constrained “coastal” MSAs
according the Rappaport and Sachs (2003) measure, which display a similar pattern.
5.2 Individual level estimation – using Current Population Survey
(CPS) 1996-2006
The empirical results presented above suggest that an increase in MSA-level house prices
exert a negative price eﬀect on births among non-owners and a net positive eﬀect on births
among owners, all else equal. These estimates are generated by an aggregated cell-level
analysis, but the underlying conceptual framework is at the individual level. We thus turn
to individual-level Current Population Survey (CPS) data to check that the story told by
aggregate level data is conﬁrmed with individual level data. We map the older MSA desig-
nations provided in the CPS (as in the Census) to the 2009 MSA designations provided in
the FHFA house price data using the crosswalk procedure described in the appendix. In the
CPS we do not see the full population of births, as we do with an analysis of Vital Statistics
birth data. However, as a supplementary data source, the CPS oﬀers the distinct advantage
25of directly identifying home-owners.
In this individual level analysis, we deﬁne Owni as an indicator for whether the individual
in the CPS is the household head or head’s spouse and the household is reported to own
their home. In the aggregate analysis above, ownership was deﬁned at the group level in
the baseline year of 1990. Here it is deﬁned at the individual level in the current year, as
we have no measure of lagged home ownership available. Caution should thus be exercised
in assigning a causal interpretation to the HousePricemt−1 ∗ Owni interaction term in this
speciﬁcation, since individuals who intend to have a baby this year might decide to buy
a house in anticipation of that event. This is another reason we consider this analysis
supplementary to the main analysis above.
We deﬁne the dependent variable HadBabyi to be one if there is a child under the age
of one in the household. All the other variables are deﬁned at the MSA level as deﬁned in
equation (1) above. Explanatory variables, including the house price index, are matched to
observations by the year prior to the survey year in order to capture the eﬀect of conditions
in the year of the baby’s conception. (We do not have perfect birth-date or gestation infor-
mation, as we do in the Vital Statistics natality ﬁles, and so here we use year minus one as
an approximation.) Recall that our goal is to obtain an estimate of the causal relationship of
house prices on current period birth rates. Even if we had individual level house prices, we
would not use them because individuals are likely to sort into houses at least in part based
on their expectations of number of children. For example, individuals intending to have more
children will likely seek larger houses or houses in better school districts, which tend to be
more expensive. We thus use MSA-level house prices conditional on MSA ﬁxed eﬀects (to
control for endogenous sorting into higher or lower priced MSAs) in all our analyses.
Table 9 reports the results estimated using a linear probability model.18 In the pooled
sample regression reported in column 1, we see the familiar pattern of point estimates –
a negative point estimate on HousePricemt−1 (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level) and a
18Probit marginal eﬀects are similar and available upon request.
26positive point estimate on the interaction of HousePricemt−1 ∗ Owni (signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level). Columns 2-4 report the results including the additional time-varying MSA-
level controls: unemployment rates and wages. Overall, this set of individual-level results
give us conﬁdence that our interpretation of the results from the aggregate level analyses is
appropriate. In particular, we see that the positive eﬀect is being driven by individuals that
are self-reported to be home owners.
5.3 Housing Bust Periods (1990-1996 and 2007-2009)
Our analysis has thus far been limited to a period of history characterized by rising house
prices. It is interesting to consider explicitly the relationship between housing price decreases
and birth rates. There might be asymmetric eﬀects, whereby an increase in housing wealth
might lead people move up their period of childbearing to a greater extent than a decrease
in housing wealth will lead people to delay. One possible reason for such an asymmetry is
that there is a biological timing constraint that individuals are reluctant to push against.
It becomes an empirical question as to whether there are diﬀerential responses to house
price rises and declines. To consider this explicitly, we want use data from two periods of
house price decline: 1990-1996 and 2007-2010. Figure 1 shows these two periods: between
1990-1996 prices declined gradually and between 2007-2010 there is a dramatic decline in
prices. Unfortunately Vital Statistics birth data is not available for conception years past
2006, so we can only look at the 1990-1996 housing bust period using the approach of the
main analysis. We therefore turn to individual level data sources for 2007-2010 period.
We begin by examining the 1990-1996 bust period using the approach used in the main
analysis. Table 9, column 1 displays the results. The pattern on the coeﬃcients remains
similar to the 1997-2006 period – a positive coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 ∗ Ownmg and a
negative coeﬃcient HousePricemt−1 – although results are not statistically signiﬁcant. In
column 2 we report results from an individual level analysis from the CPS for this time
27period. Again, results are similar to those found in the 1997-2006 period, except in this case
the coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 ∗Ownmg is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
As in the analysis for 1997-2006 period, the coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1is not statistically
signiﬁcant.
Next, we move on to the 2007-2010 housing bust period, which is characterized by a
steep decline in prices. First, we repeat the individual-level CPS analysis for this period.
Table 9, column 3 displays results.The pattern on the coeﬃcients is extremely similar to
both the earlier bust period (1990-1996) and the housing boom period (1997-2006). Since
Vital Statistics birth data is not available for this period, we supplement the analysis by
examining data from the American Communities Survey (ACS), conducted annually by the
U.S. Census Bureau, beginning in 2000. We obtained this data from IPUMS. The data
is available with the equivalent of MSA identiﬁers starting in 2005.19 We construct the
indicator variables “had baby” and “own home” in the same manner as described above for
the CPS data. Again, the coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1 ∗Owni is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcient on HousePricemt−1is positive, although it is not
statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings give us some conﬁdence that it is appropriate to use our preferred aggregate
results above – generated from data for the years 1997-2006, a period characterized by house
price increases – to make out-of-sample predictions to more recent years, characterized by
house price declines. Between 2006 and 2010, housing prices fell $63,000 among the MSAs in
our sample. At the mean rate of home ownership, our estimates imply that this corresponds
to a 5.1 percent decline in births. We can also simulate the eﬀect of the rise in unemployment
rates over the period. Between 2006 and 2010, unemployment rates rose 5.14 percentage
points.20 Holding housing prices ﬁxed, our estimates imply that this corresponds to a 1.1%
19The ACS identiﬁes PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas), which IPUMS has matched to MSAs. We
then use the crosswalk procedure described in the data appendix to match to the housing data (Ruggles
et al., 2010). PUMAs are also identiﬁed in 2003, but we do not use this data.
20Both the average fall in home prices and the average increase in unemployment rates are population
weighted average changes for the 163 MSAs in our sample between 2006 and 2010.
28decline in births. A simulation of the two changes in tandem implies that in the great
recession period 2007-2010 the decline in housing prices and increase in unemployment rates
is associated with a 6 percent decline in current-period birth rates.
6 Interpreting the Results
6.1 Interpreting the Magnitudes of the Estimated Eﬀects: Simu-
lation Exercise
Our analysis of Vital Statistics birth data coupled with MSA-level house prices shows that
an increase in MSA-level house prices, all else held constant, is associated with fewer births
among non-owners and a net increase in births among owners. In order to facilitate an
understanding of whether these results are economically large or small, we have conducted
a simple simulation exercise. Figure 4 presents the predicted eﬀect of a $10,000 increase in
house prices on births for each race/ethnic group as well as ﬁrst and higher parity births.
The x-axis represents group home ownership rates and the y-axis represents the net predicted
percentage change in births from of a $10,000 increase in house prices, conditional on each
level of home ownership. The prediction is indicated by the solid line and a 95% conﬁdence
interval is indicated by the dashed lines.21 The predictions are calculated based on point
estimates displayed in Table 6, which include all of the main demographic group and MSA
level control variables, MSA and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and MSA ownership-category time trends.
In all cases, the exercise suggests a positive, linear relationship between home ownership
rates and the change in births due to a $10,000 increase in house prices. The pooled estimates
imply that as the ownership rate increases from 10 percent to 20 percent, the net eﬀect
become positive. This implies that in MSAs with sizable rates of home ownership, the
21The 95% conﬁdence interval was estimated by 100 bootstrap replications. The net predicted eﬀect and
conﬁdence intervals were calculated at each displayed value of home ownership in 10% intervals and smoothed
using a locally weighted linear regression.
29positive home equity eﬀect among owners is large enough to outweigh the negative price
eﬀect, leading to increases in MSA-level birth rates. Among whites, the impact switches from
negative to positive between 40 and 50 percent ownership. For blacks, the impact becomes
positive between 10 and 20 percent, and for Hispanics, it is always positive (which follows
from the surprising positive point estimate on the house price variable in that speciﬁcation).
In the CPS, for the period 1997-2006, mean home ownership among females age 20-44
is 50 percent. At this rate, the net eﬀect of a $10,000 increase in prices is a 0.8 percent
increase in births. We also simulate eﬀects using group-speciﬁc rates of home ownership and
group-speciﬁc point estimates. Among whites, the mean home ownership rate is 59 percent,
which is associated with a net increase of 0.5 percent in births. Among blacks, the mean
home ownership rate is 30 percent, which is associated with a net increase of 0.8 percent in
births. And among white Hispanics, the mean home ownership rate is 35 percent, which is
associated with a net increase in births of 0.9 percent. It is also instructive to consider an
out-of-sample prediction assuming extreme values of ownership rates, to obtain an estimate
of the eﬀect among owners and non-owners. Assuming a 100 percent ownership rate, the
net impact of a $10,000 house price increase is a 2.1 percent increase overall. Separately
by race/ethnicity, our simulations suggest a 1.9 percent increase for whites, a 4.9 percent
increase for Blacks, and a 1.9 percent increase for Hispanics.22
An additional interesting empirical exercise is to consider the relative impact of unem-
ployment rates versus housing prices. Using the same simulation procedure described above,
we estimate the relative impacts of a one standard deviation increase in housing prices and
decrease in unemployment rates. We ﬁnd that at the mean rate of ownership (49%), a one
standard deviation increase in housing prices leads to a 7.8 percent increase in births while a
22These results are comparable to those found in a contemporaneous working paper by Lovenheim and
Mumford (2011), which investigates the relationship between changes in home value and current period
fertility using individual-level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1990-2007. The
authors estimate linear probability models of the probability that a woman gives birth in a given year as a
function of two and four year changes in the reported market value of her home. The authors ﬁnd that a
$10,000 increase in an individual’s real housing wealth is associated with a 0.07 percentage point (1.3 percent
at the mean) increase in the probability of having a child.
30one standard deviation increase in unemployment rates leads to only a 0.37 percent decrease
across all rates of ownership. (Note that this estimated eﬀect of unemployment is based
on the point estimate in table 3, column 7, which is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
conventional levels). At a 100 percent rate of ownership, a one standard deviation increase
in housing prices is associated with a 25 percent increase in births. This indicates that for
homeowners, the impact of a change in housing prices is almost 100 times that of a change
in unemployment rates. Even among renters, the negative price eﬀect an increase in housing
prices is 3.8 percent, 10 times as large as the eﬀect of unemployment rates. This highlights
the importance of considering housing markets in any empirical analysis of how economic
conditions aﬀect fertility outcomes.
Finally, we use our estimates to simulate the aggregate eﬀects of the recent housing boom
and bust periods. The average year-to-year increase in prices 1997-2006 was $12,000. Our
estimates imply that at the mean level of home ownership among women age 20-44 (50
percent), this would have led to a 0.9 percent increase in births, all else held constant. The
average increase in prices from 1997 to 2006 was $119,000; which our estimates imply would
have led to a 10 percent increase in births, all else held constant.23
6.2 The “Home Equity Eﬀect”
We have interpreted the positive eﬀect of house price increases for owners – inferred from the
estimated coeﬃcient on the HousePricemt−1 ∗ Ownmg interaction in the MSA-group level
analyses and the individual-level CPS analysis – as a net positive housing wealth eﬀect. As
noted above, we use this term to encompass two potential mechanisms. First, there could
be a traditional wealth eﬀect that increases the demand for children. Second, there could
be an increase in liquiﬁable housing wealth that otherwise credit-constrained consumers use
23The population weighted average home price change for the 163 MSAs in our sample from 1997 to 2006
was $119,293 and the average year to year change was $12,052.
31to fund current period consumption, including child-related expenses. (Note that the ﬁrst
eﬀect likely implies an increase in the number of children ever born, while the second eﬀect
could simply reﬂect a change in timing.) We are agnostic about the extent to which each
of these two mechanisms is separately contributing to the empirical eﬀect we observe in the
data. However, it is interesting to consider the feasibility of the home equity extraction
explanation.
Before examining data on home equity extraction, it is useful to place our ﬁnding in the
context of the existing literature on consumption and housing wealth. There is a large body
of research on the propensity for households to fund current consumption out of housing
wealth (See for example, Case, Quigley, and Shiller (2005); Benjamin, Chinloy, and Jud
(2004); Bostic, Gabrial, and Painter (2009); Haurin and Rosenthal (2005)). Most work in
this literature ﬁnds that the propensity to consume out of housing wealth is substantially
higher than the propensity to consume out of ﬁnancial wealth, although there is disagreement
about the magnitudes of these distinct marginal propensities to consume (Greenspan and
Kennedy, 2007). It is also understood that there are two distinct eﬀects of housing values on
consumption – the traditional wealth eﬀect and a home equity extraction eﬀect. According to
the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, among families in the 40-60th percentile of
the income distribution in 2004, housing represents an average of 48 percent of a household’s
total assets (Bucks et al., 2009). This indicates an increase in home prices could lead to
a substantial increase in wealth for many homeowners. But, if households do not intend
to realize these gains over their lifetime by selling their current house and moving to a
lower-priced real estate market, there is not necessarily an increase in permanent wealth.
However, there might still be an equity extraction eﬀect. That eﬀect is practically realized
by reﬁnancing one’s mortgage, or obtaining a second mortgage, home equity loan, or home
equity line of credit.
Greenspan and Kennedy (2007) empirically investigate the use of home equity extractions
to fund consumption during the period 1991 to 2005, a similar time period to the one that
32we study in the present paper. They report that during this period, free cash resulting
from the three types of equity extraction averaged about $530 billion annually. Equity
extracted through sales of existing homes accounted for about two-thirds of total free cash;
home equity loans accounted for close to 20 percent, and cash-out reﬁnancings about 13
percent. The extracted cash was used to ﬁnance consumer spending, outlays for home
improvements, debt repayment, acquisition of assets, and other uses. In general, the use of
housing equity to fund consumption is a relatively expensive approach. Hurst and Staﬀord
(2004) propose that extracting home equity to fund consumption, as opposed to tapping
into more liquid assets, should be relatively more common among individuals with lower
amounts of liquid assets. They empirically conﬁrm this pattern using individual-level data
on households during the period 1991 to 1996 (Hurst and Staﬀord, 2004). Mian and Suﬁ
(2009) estimate that the average homeowner extracted 25 to 30 cents for every dollar increase
in home equity during the 1997 to 2009 period. They further ﬁnd that money extracted from
increased home equity was not used to purchase new real estate or pay down high credit card
balances, which they interpret as suggesting that borrowed funds were used for consumption
or home improvement expenses. In addition, they ﬁnd that home equity-based borrowing was
strongest among younger households. We view these patterns as being potentially consistent
with the suggestion of our work that individuals used increased housing equity to pay for
child-related expenses.
We use data from the 1997-2009 ﬁles of the American Housing Survey (AHS) to tabulate
rates of home equity borrowing and reﬁnancing, and the extent to which this is related to
rising house prices. Our main goal is to simply observe the extent to which households are
accessing their housing wealth. This speaks to the possibility that part of our documented
“home equity eﬀect” might be driven by the use of extracted home equity to fund current
childbearing-related expenses. The AHS includes a survey of about 60,000 housing units
across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. It is conducted every two years, in odd-
33numbered years.24
Table 10 reports the results from estimating regressions of the likelihood of having an
equity loan/line or a reﬁnanced mortgage on HousePricemt, as well as MSA-year means for
the relevant variables. The top panel of the table reports rates of housing equity loans and
lines of credit and mortgage reﬁnancing. These questions are asked of home owners only.
We see in the data that 20 percent of owners report having an equity loan or line of credit
and as prices increase homeowners are more likely to tap into housing wealth in this matter.
In column (3) we can see that this is being driven by increases in home equity lines of credit.
The AHS also gives information about rates of reﬁnancing. The mean rate of having
reﬁnanced a ﬁrst mortgage is 35 and the mean rate of having reﬁnanced a second mortgage
is 7 percent. The survey asks homeowners who report having reﬁnanced why they chose to
reﬁnance, which is reported in the bottom panel of table 10. Eighty-six percent respond to
obtain a lower interest rate. Lower interest rates leave people with lower monthly payments,
which would make more disposable income available to fund current consumption. Interest-
ingly, the only motivating factor in the decision to reﬁnance which is increasing with house
prices is explicitly “to get cash.” This speaks directly to the use of housing equity to fund
current consumption and its relationship to rising home prices.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated how current house prices aﬀect current period fertility. Our
results suggest that house prices are a relevant factor in a couple’s decision to have a baby
at the present time. House prices lead to a negative price eﬀect that conditionally reduces
birth rates in the current period, and an oﬀsetting positive home equity eﬀect that leads
to a net increase in births among homeowners. We use the estimated coeﬃcients from our
24The AHS also includes a metropolitan area survey that has included varying numbers of areas and has
been conducted at varying intervals over the past 30 years.
34regression analyses to simulate the eﬀect of a $10,000 increase in house prices on current
year births. This exercise indicates that when home ownership rates reach 20 percent, the
net eﬀect becomes positive. At the mean U.S. home ownership in our sample period, the
net eﬀect of a $10,000 increase in prices is a 0.8 percent increase in births. Given underlying
diﬀerences in home ownership rates and slightly diﬀerent point estimates, the predicted net
eﬀect of house price changes varies across race/ethnic groups. We simulate that a $10,000
increase in MSA-level house prices leads to a 0.4 percent increase in current year births
among whites, a 0.6 percent increase in births among blacks, and a 0.8 percent increase in
births among white Hispanics. Interestingly, these eﬀects are substantially larger than the
eﬀects of changes in the unemployment rate. Moreover, using our estimates to make an
out-of-sample prediction of the the impact of the “Great Recession”, we ﬁnd that the fall in
housing prices between 2006 and 2010 was associated with a 4.9 percent decline in births.
Our paper is written within the paradigm of the empirical literature on the cyclicality of
fertility and as such, it is about the timing of fertility decisions. We provide evidence sug-
gesting that couples use some of their increased housing wealth to “fund” their childbearing
goals. Our paper potentially demonstrates empirically that (imperfect) credit markets aﬀect
fertility timing. We have discussed our results in terms of the decision couples make with
regard to whether or not to have a baby in the current period. We leave it to future research
to investigate how house prices aﬀect completed fertility or the demand for children more
generally. In addition, it might also be true that when house prices increase or decrease,
parents increase (or decrease) quality investments in children, where quality of children is
meant in the Beckerian sense. For example, perhaps some home-owning parents use their
increased home equity to purchase, say, private education for their children. Once we allow
for this possibility, it becomes clear that our empirical analysis is not designed to capture the
full range of how real estate markets might aﬀect childbearing and child rearing decisions.
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A.1 Metropolitan Areas
Metropolitan statistical areas are deﬁned by the Oﬃce of Management and Budget. Their ge-
ographic deﬁnitions are based on core urban areas with a population of 50,000 or more and ad-
jacent counties with a “high degree of social and economic integration (as measured by com-
muting to work) with the urban core” (Census Bureau documentation). Current metropoli-
tan area deﬁnitions include both metropolitan areas (MSA) and divisions (MSADs), which
are smaller units within this metropolitan area. Current deﬁnitions also include an alterna-
tive to the MSA/MSAD for metropolitan areas in the New England states, which are called
New England City Town Areas (NECTAs). The boundaries of MSAs change over time as
city populations change. The Oﬃce of Management and Budget releases revised deﬁnitions
based on the decennial census and yearly census population estimates, and in addition to
changing MSA compositions, sometimes changes the labels associated with each type of
unit. A major change was done in 2003, at which point the coding system changed from a
4-digit coding system to a 5-digit coding system. Prior to 2003, instead of MSADs Primary
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) were used and instead of NECTAs, New England
Metropolitan County Areas (NECMAs) were used.
The housing price index is available at the level of MSA/MSAD, based on the November
2008 deﬁnitions (released in December 2009) , Since the index is based on repeat sales of the
same home, the 2009 deﬁnitions apply throughout the data. For example, suppose a home
sells once in 1980, 1990, and 2005. Suppose that in 1980 and 1990 it was not in an MSA, but
in 2005 it was. Then, the home is considered part of the MSA and the housing price indices
for 1980 and 1990 are revised to reﬂect the current boundaries.The rest of this appendix
explains how we harmonize all other data sources to match this level of aggregation. Table
1 lists the level of geographic detail available for each of our control variables.
40A-1-1 County Level Data
Whenever county level data is available, it is the preferred level of disaggregation because
we can use it to construct MSA/MSADs which will exactly match the housing price index
data. Data available at this level of disaggregation includes the Vital Statistics Natality
Data (conﬁdential ﬁles), Vital Statistics population data, Census median home value data,
Bureau of Labor Statistics Unemployment data, Bureau of Economic analysis income per
capita data, and the Rappaport and Sachs (2003) coastal measure. To construct MSAs
from the county level data, we use the 2009 metropolitan area deﬁnition ﬁles available from
the Census Bureau at: http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/2009/
List1.txt. These ﬁles map entire counties to a 2009 OMB MSA/MSAD deﬁnitions, thus,
we can construct MSAs/MSADs that are exactly equivalent to those used in the housing
price data.
It is worth noting a few technical points about linking counties to MSAs. First, Miami-
Dade County, FL was renamed between the 1990 and 2000 census; so in all cases we have
assigned the post-2000 FIPS code to this county.25 Another issue concerns BLS Local Area
Unemployment (LAU) Statistics, which are calculated at the county level, but use a coding
system based on what are called “areas”. For the most part, the area codes are simply county
FIPS codes. However, for counties which had large populations (50,000-100,000 and 100,000
plus) in 1970; a diﬀerent coding system is applied.26 We construct a crosswalk between
the two using state FIPS codes and county names using vintage 2009 county FIPS codes.27
Finally, in the BEA personal income data, BEA combines some counties/county equivalents
in Virginia and assigns new county codes. We re-assign those counties which are contained
within an MSA to one of the combined counties’ FIPS code. In all cases these combinations





41A-1-2 Vintage Metropolitan Area Level Data
For the case when counties are not available, but vintage metropolitan area deﬁnitions
are available, we use those. By vintage metropolitan area deﬁnitions, we are referring to
metropolitan areas based on historical deﬁnitions which may diﬀer in composition from the
2009 deﬁnitions. Data that is available in this manner includes the 1990 and 2000 Cen-
sus microdata (used to construct home ownership rates), the Current Population Survey
data (used to construct wages and fraction college educated), and the Saiz (2012) elasticity
measure. The vintage deﬁnitions used in these data include the 1983 MSA/PMSA, 1993
MSA/PMSA, 1999 MSA/NECMA, and 2003 MSA/NECTA codes, as described in table 1.
To match the vintage deﬁnitions to the 2009 deﬁnitions, we begin by creating a crosswalk
that links the counties that make up the diﬀerent metropolitan areas over time. Unlike the
current 2009 MSA/MSAD deﬁnitions (and vintage 2003 MSA/MSAD deﬁnitions) which
directly map entire counties to MSAs, the earlier metropolitan area (and NECTA/NECMA)
deﬁnitions allow for a single county to be in multiple metropolitan areas. For the case when
a single county is in multiple MSAs/PMSAs/NECTAs/NECMAs, we use 1990 population
counts of the minor civil divisions (a smaller unit within the metropolitan area) to assign
the county to whichever MSAs/PMSAs/NECTAs/NECMAs the majority of the population
resides.
From this county-msa crosswalk, we construct vintage MSA-to-2009 MSA/MSAD cross-
walks. In most cases, there is a one to one match between the vintage MSA deﬁnitions and
the 2009 deﬁnitions. In some cases, however, its possible for a vintage metropolitan area to
have split into two or combined to form a single metropolitan area by 2009. For metropolitan
areas that have combined to form one metropolitan area by 2009, we use 1990 population
weights to create a population weighted average of the data. For metropolitan areas that
have split , we apply the single data point to all the split-oﬀ areas.
42A-1-3 Other Data Used in Aggregate Analyses
There are two ﬁnal types of matches that are made to the aggregate data: the Davidoﬀ
(2012) “Sand State” measure and the Case-Shiller data. The Davidoﬀ (2012) data is only
available at the state level. Since counties are wholly contained within states, we use the
county-to-MSA crosswalk to identify the state(s) in which each MSA is contained. All of the
MSAs used in the “Sand State” speciﬁcation were wholly contained in a single state, so we
simply labeled the MSAs accordingly. The Case-Shiller housing price index (which is used in
place of the FHFA housing price index in table 5), is available for only 20 metropolitan areas,
18 of which match to the 2009 OMB MSA deﬁnitions, one matches to an 2009 OMB MSAD
deﬁnition (Chicago), and one does not match any OMB deﬁnition (New York City). When
constructing the data for speciﬁcations that use the Case-Shiller HPI, we use only the 27
MSADs that match to one of the 19 OMB MSA/MSAD deﬁnition. This means that multiple
MSADS in one MSA may use the same value for the Case-Shiller HPI index. However; when
we construct housing prices from the Case-Shiller index we use MSAD-speciﬁc 2000 median
home values.
A-1-3 Attaching Aggregate Measures to the Individual Level Data
In the individual level data, we are given the vintage metropolitan area codes. In this case,
we need to construct the housing price, wage, and unemployment data according to those
deﬁnitions. In the individual CPS we are provided with 1983, 1993 and 2003 MSA/2003
NECTA codes and in the AHS we are provided with 1980 MSA codes. For the ACS, only
PUMAs (Public Use Microdata Areas) are provided, however, IPUMS has created a cross-
walk procedure and attached 1993 MSA codes, which we will use Ruggles et al. (2010).
Recall the unemployment data is at the county level. In this case, we use county-to-vintage
MSA cross walk described in the section above. For the wage data, linking to the CPS is
trivial since it was constructed in the CPS and therefore uses the same MSA deﬁnitions.
43For linking the wage data to the ACS and for linking the housing data to the CPS, ACS
and AHS , we again use the county-to-vintage MSA crosswalk described above. In this
case, if multiple 1980/1983/1993/2003 MSA/2003 NECTA combine to form a single MSA
in 2009, we assign the housing price data to each vintage MSAs. For the case when a
single 1980/1983/1993/2003 MSA/2003 NECTA splits to form multiple MSAs in 2009, we
we use 1990 population weights to assign a weighted average of home prices to the vintage
metropolitan areas codes. Finally, since CPS uses diﬀerent MSA codes over time which are
not consistent, we use the linked 2009 MSA deﬁnition for the ﬁxed eﬀects. In the case where
the vintage MSA split into multiple 2009 MSADs, we use assign the code of the MSAD with
the largest population share.
A-2 Construction of House Prices
We use the same procedure used by Glaeser et al. (2008) to construct house prices. First,
we construct a 2000 median home value from county-level census data, using the crosswalk
procedure outlined above to create a population-weighted median home value. We inﬂate
this value to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U “All Items-Less Shelter Series.” We then take
this value and scale it by the percent change in the housing price index from 2000 to the
year of interest, which is calculated: (hpit−hpi2000)/hpi2000. The housing price index is also
inﬂated to 2006 dollars using the the CPI-U “All Items-Less Shelter Series” prior to scaling.
This gives us a value that proxies for the price growth of a median value home in each MSA
over time.
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Notes: House prices are calculated using 2000 MSA median home values, which are scaled
by either the FHFA house price index or the Case-Shiller house price index to create
MSA-year median home values, which are then averaged over the 163 MSAs (27 MSAs for
the Case-Shiller Index) in our sample each year 1984-2010. Both are adjusted to 2006
dollars using CPI-U "all items less shelter" series. Percentage change in home prices is
calculated as (HousePricet−HousePricet−1)/HousePricet−1. In both ﬁgures, the left
y-axis is represents the mean value of the FHFA-constructed prices and the right y-axis
represents the mean value of the Case-Shiller constructed prices.
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Notes: Displayed are trends in fertility rates, housing prices, and unemployment rates.
Annual fertility rates (births per 1000 women) are calculated using yearly totals of
MSA-level births to women age 20-44 divided by total female population age 20-44, both
obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics System.
House Prices are 2000 median home values scaled by the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) housing price index, and are displayed in 2006 dollars. Unemployment rate is the
annual mean unemployment are taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics local area
unemployment statistics. All three measures are yearly mean values calculated based on
the 163 MSAs in our sample.












































































































































































































































































0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
Ownership Rate
(f) Higher Births
Notes: These ﬁgures display the results of simulation exercises using estimates from the
regression speciﬁcation displayed table 6. Simulated is the percentage change in predicted
births from a $10,000 increase in mean housing prices for each ownership rate o displayed on
the x axis: (FertRate|HousePrice = h + 10k,OwnRate = o)−(FertRate|HousePrice =
h,OwnRate = o)/(FertRate|HousePrice = h,OwnRate = o). The solid line represents
the predicted eﬀect and the dashed line represents a 95% conﬁdence interval, both of which
were calculated for each displayed level of o and smoothed using a locally weighted linear








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































49Table 3: Main Speciﬁcation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate)
HousePricemt−1 ∗ Ownratemg 0.0437*** 0.0437*** 0.0437*** 0.0438*** 0.0453*** 0.0456*** 0.0247***
(0.00409) (0.00412) (0.00411) (0.00414) (0.00447) (0.00453) (0.00373)
HousePricemt−1 -0.0124*** -0.0127*** -0.0125*** -0.0128*** -0.0101*** -0.0152*** -0.00411**
(0.000949) (0.00107) (0.000970) (0.00109) (0.00212) (0.00182) (0.00164)
OwnRatemg 0.117 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.101 0.0988 0.101
(0.323) (0.323) (0.323) (0.323) (0.324) (0.327) (0.275)
race1age20_29 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.950*** 0.955*** 0.955*** 0.893***
(0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) (0.129) (0.123)
race2age20_29 1.340*** 1.340*** 1.340*** 1.340*** 1.343*** 1.340*** 1.243***
(0.188) (0.188) (0.188) (0.187) (0.186) (0.187) (0.177)
race3age20_29 1.577*** 1.577*** 1.576*** 1.577*** 1.579*** 1.576*** 1.496***
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.163) (0.165) (0.166)
race2age30_44 0.0155 0.0158 0.0153 0.0155 0.0171 0.0148 -0.0532
(0.0759) (0.0757) (0.0759) (0.0757) (0.0748) (0.0754) (0.0672)
race3age30_44 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.373*** 0.373*** 0.372*** 0.368*** 0.320***
(0.0786) (0.0784) (0.0786) (0.0784) (0.0775) (0.0782) (0.0593)
FracCollegemgt−1 -0.350*** -0.349*** -0.353*** -0.352*** -0.371*** -0.389*** -0.352***
(0.0594) (0.0595) (0.0598) (0.0599) (0.0627) (0.0653) (0.0632)
UnemploymentRatemt−1 -0.00465 -0.00448 -0.00178 -0.00198 -0.00218
(0.00367) (0.00352) (0.00205) (0.00198) (0.00194)
25thWagemt−1 0.00197* 0.00184* 0.000556 0.000167 0.000608
(0.00109) (0.00104) (0.000621) (0.000524) (0.000590)
50thWagemt−1 0.000810 0.000792 0.000887* 0.000479 0.000767*
(0.000900) (0.000887) (0.000500) (0.000402) (0.000446)
75thWagemt−1 0.000488 0.000527 0.000205 0.000168 0.000154
(0.000525) (0.000511) (0.000223) (0.000204) (0.000215)
MSA Fixed Eﬀects x x x x x x x
Year Fixed Eﬀects x x x x x x x
MSA Trends x x
MSA Quadratic x
MSA-Own Category Trends x
R2 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.906 0.908 0.909 0.936
Number of MSAs 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
N 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780
Notes: Fertility rates are total births over the total female population in each MSA, year of conception, age
category and race/ethnicity cell for women age 20-44. Mean home ownership rates are calculated in 1990
Census by year, msa, age category, and race/ethnicity. Fraction of cell that is a college graduate is matched
by msa, year, age category and race. House prices (10,000s), unemployment rates, and male wages are
matched by msa and year of conception. Data sources are: Vital Statistics (births, population), Census
and Federal Housing Finance Agency (house prices), Current Population Survey (wages, fraction college),
and Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rates). All speciﬁcation are weighted by the total number
of births in the cell. Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the msa level. * p < .1, **














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































51Table 5: Alternate Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate) log(FertRate)
HousePricemt−1 ∗ Ownratemg 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0247*** 0.0207*** 0.0247*** 0.0218***
(0.00373) (0.00373) (0.00372) (0.00372) (0.00355) (0.00373) (0.00367)
HousePricemt−1 -0.00411** -0.00415** -0.00411** -0.00399** -0.00305** -0.00470*** -0.00416*
(0.00164) (0.00165) (0.00164) (0.00162) (0.00144) (0.00162) (0.00246)
OwnRatemg 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.101 -0.636** 0.101 0.310
(0.275) (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) (0.291) (0.275) (0.237)
UnemploymentRatemt−1 -0.00218 -0.00219 -0.00208 -0.00209 -0.00192 -0.00296 0.000364
(0.00194) (0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00200) (0.00193) (0.00184) (0.00312)
25thWagemt−1 0.000608 -0.00310 0.000526 0.000284
(0.000590) (0.00505) (0.000593) (0.000827)
50thWagemt−1 0.000767* -0.00202 0.000803* -0.0000452
(0.000446) (0.00240) (0.000449) (0.000736)
75thWagemt−1 0.000154 -0.00581*** 0.000136 0.0000944
(0.000215) (0.00158) (0.000209) (0.000245)
FracCollegemgt−1 -0.352*** -0.353*** -0.352*** -0.351*** -0.356*** -0.353*** -0.307***











25thWagemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg 0.00960
(0.0129)
50thWagemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg 0.00792
(0.00617)




MSA Fixed Eﬀects x x x x x x x
Year Fixed Eﬀects x x x x x x x
MSA-Own Cat Trend x x x x x x x
MSA Boundaries Constant x
R2 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.936 0.937 0.936 0.938
Number of MSAs 163 163 163 163 163 163 117
N 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 9780 7020
Notes: Fertility rates are total births over the total female population in each MSA, year of conception, age
category and race/ethnicity cell for women age 20-44. Mean home ownership rates are calculated in 1990
Census by year, msa, education category, age category, and race. Fraction of cell that is a college graduate
is matched by msa, year, age category and race. House prices (10,000s), Income per capita, Male wages,
All wages, and average rent are matched by MSA and year of conception. All regressions include group,
MSA and year ﬁxed eﬀects. In column (7) the sample is limited to MSAs with boundaries that do not
change 1990-2006. Data sources are: Vital Statistics (births, population), Census and Federal Housing
Finance Agency (house prices), Current Population Survey (wages, fraction college), and Bureau of Labor
Statistics (unemployment rates). All speciﬁcation are weighted by the total number of births in the cell.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































54Table 8: Individual Level Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HousePricemt−1 ∗ Owni 0.000509*** 0.000509*** 0.000509*** 0.000510***
(0.000172) (0.000172) (0.000179) (0.000179)
HousePricemt−1 -0.000303** -0.000304** -0.000299** -0.000314**
(0.000120) (0.000125) (0.000130) (0.000134)
Owni 0.0368*** 0.0368*** 0.0372*** 0.0371***









Demographics x x x x
MSA Fixed Eﬀects x x x
Year Fixed Eﬀects x x x
Mean Had Baby 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.063
Mean Own 0.498 0.498 0.498 0.498
R2 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
N 233942 233823 206169 206050
Notes: Sample is women age 20-44 in March Current Population Survey 1991-2007. Dependent variable is
an indicator for having a child under one. House prices (10,000s), unemployment rates, and male wages are
matched by msa and year. Ownership is the household’s home ownership status, which is assigned as a 1
when the household owns a home and the respondent is the household head or spouse of the household
head. All regressions include ﬁxed eﬀects for education, year, age category, race, Hispanicity, and msa.
Data sources are: Census and Federal Housing Finance Agency (house prices), Current Population Survey
(individual level data, wages), and Bureau of Labor Statistics (unemployment rates). Robust standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the msa level. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
55Table 9: Bust Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggregate-90-96 CPS-90-96 CPS-07-09 ACS-07-09
HousePricemt−1 ∗ OwnRatemg 0.0122 0.000666** 0.000667*** 0.000449***
(0.0147) (0.000279) (0.000213) (0.000116)
HousePricemt−1 -0.00256 -0.0000815 -0.000664 0.0000333
(0.00633) (0.000491) (0.000495) (0.000217)
Own 0.0695 0.0367*** 0.0309*** 0.0367***
(0.370) (0.00387) (0.00465) (0.00218)
UnempRatemt−1 -0.000853 -0.000476 -0.000437 0.000481
(0.00157) (0.000896) (0.00151) (0.000470)
25thWagemt−1 0.000285 -0.000400 0.000414 -0.000154
(0.000728) (0.000712) (0.00125) (0.000336)
50thWagemt−1 0.000716 0.000223 -0.000694 -0.000270
(0.000687) (0.000676) (0.00103) (0.000331)
75thWagemt−1 -0.000153 0.000476 -0.000652 0.000221
(0.000415) (0.000463) (0.000498) (0.000153)
Demographics x x x x
MSA Fixed Eﬀects s x x x x
Year Fixed Eﬀects x x x x
R2 0.947 0.030 0.032 0.012
N 6684 141250 81907 851178
Notes: In columns (1) the sample is all births to women age 20-44 for the bust period of 1990-1996
according to the speciﬁcation in table 1, column (6) and the dependent variable is the fertility rate. In
column (2), the sample is women 20-44 in the March Current Population Survey for the bust period
1990-1996 and in column (3) for the bust period 2007-2009. In column (4) the sample is women 20-44 in
the American Communities Survey for the bust period 2007-2009. The dependent variable in columns
(2)-(4) is an indicator for having a child under one. In column (1) ownership rates are matched by MSA,
age category and race/ethnicity. In columns (2)-(4), ownershipis the household’s home ownershipstatus,
which is assigned as a 1 when the household owns a home and the respondent is the household head or
spouse of the household head. House prices (10,000s), unemployment rates, and male wages are matched
by msa and year. Column (1) includes group, MSA and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (2)-(4) include ﬁxed
eﬀects for MSA, year, race, Hispanicity, age category and education. Data sources are: Census and Federal
Housing Finance Agency (house prices), Current Population Survey (wages), and Bureau of Labor
Statistics (unemployment rates). Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the msa level.
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
56Table 10: House Prices and Home Equity Withdrawal Behavior
Dependent Variable: Does the Home Owner Currently Have a....?
Equity Loan Equity Line Equity First Mortgage Second Mortgage
or Line of Credit of Credit Loan Reﬁnanced Reﬁnanced
HousePricemt 0.00182** 0.00299*** -0.000478 0.00269* -0.00171
(0.000752) (0.000890) (0.000509) (0.00145) (0.00219)
Mean Dep Var. 0.196 0.185 0.0835 0.349 0.0755
(0.00272) (0.00329) (0.00193) (0.00449) (0.00642)
R2 0.055 0.262 0.026 0.104 0.072
N 21209 13948 20527 11289 1696
Dependent Variable: Why Did You Reﬁnance Your First Mortgage?
Lower To Get Renew Increase Reduce
Interest Rate Cash or Extend Payments Payments
HousePricemt -0.00319 0.00491*** -0.000503 0.000822 0.0000489
(0.00199) (0.00187) (0.000527) (0.000830) (0.00147)
Mean Dep. Var 0.857 0.131 0.00965 0.0221 0.104
(0.00558) (0.00537) (0.00156) (0.00234) (0.00487)
R2 0.107 0.053 0.043 0.043 0.068
N 3937 3937 3937 3937 3937
Notes: Displayed is the coeﬃcient of MSA-year house prices on the probability of making diﬀerent types of
home equity withdrawals, as well as the mean of each dependent variable. All regressions include control
for msa, year, race, ethnicity, and age. House prices (10,000s) are matched by MSA and year. Source is
American Housing Survey, National Version, Every other year 1997-2009. Reﬁnancing is only available in
2001-2009. Questions only asked of home owners. Data is in panel form and respondents are asked if they
have ever done the speciﬁc activity. For instance, the question will ask, "is the respondents ﬁrst mortgage a
reﬁnancing of a previous mortgage?" "Why reﬁnance?" is only asked for those who have reﬁnanced. The
categories are not mutually exclusive and respondents may respond yes to multiple categories.
57Table 1: (Appendix) Characteristics of Metropolitan Areas in the Sample
Percent Change Home Fertility Elasticity Coastal Sand
Metropolitan Area Name (2009 MSAD) Prices 97-06 Price 2006 Rate 2006 of Supply MSA MSA
Salinas, CA 171.4% $588,736 103.5 1.10 1 1
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 165.5% $628,696 86.3 0.89 1 1
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine, CA 164.5% $615,302 76.7 1 1
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 162.7% $338,547 90.6 0.94 1
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA 162.6% $515,061 76.1 0.63 1 1
Vallejo-Fairﬁeld, CA 151.9% $398,870 77.8 1.14 1 1
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 151.4% $474,242 81.1 0.67 1 1
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 148.7% $556,284 86.3 0.75 1 1
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach-Deerﬁeld Beach, FL 146.5% $267,370 67.9 0.65 1 1
Stockton, CA 146.4% $331,468 92.6 2.07 1 1
Modesto, CA 145.8% $314,814 90.7 2.17 1 1
Oakland-Fremont-Hayward, CA 144.1% $564,108 74.7 0.70 1 1
Miami-Miami Beach-Kendall, FL 142.6% $295,201 71.4 0.60 1 1
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Boynton Beach, FL 140.7% $290,506 76.3 0.83 1 1
Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 131.4% $510,412 73.5 1.00 1 1
Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 131.3% $241,947 86.4 1.28 1 1
Sacramento–Arden-Arcade–Roseville, CA 127.7% $351,294 76.5 1 1
Fresno, CA 126.2% $264,992 97.8 1.84 1
North Port-Bradenton-Sarasota, FL 125.7% $247,504 75.6 0.92 1 1
Port St. Lucie, FL 125.4% $238,298 79.9 1.19 1 1
Nassau-Suﬀolk, NY 124.7% $436,655 71.5 1
Bakersﬁeld-Delano, CA 123.9% $230,694 105.8 1.64 1
San Francisco-San Mateo-Redwood City, CA 122.9% $781,891 64.0 0.66 1 1
Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL 117.7% $194,512 65.8 1.07 1 1
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 117.2% $401,637 74.7 1.61 1
Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 117.0% $210,691 67.1 1.04 1 1
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 116.9% $698,468 82.6 0.76 1 1
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 112.7% $186,334 69.3 1.00 1 1
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 107.0% $221,037 72.3 1.12 1 1
Bethesda-Rockville-Frederick, MD 106.4% $445,442 80.1 1.61 1
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 106.4% $252,298 87.2 1.61 1
Atlantic City-Hammonton, NJ 105.1% $258,536 71.7 1.12 1
New York-White Plains-Wayne, NY-NJ 104.7% $472,658 69.3 0.80 1
Edison-New Brunswick, NJ 102.4% $355,049 75.1 1
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 98.4% $272,732 61.2 1.34 1
Visalia-Porterville, CA 94.6% $224,105 108.8 1.97 1
Boston-Quincy, MA 94.2% $349,966 61.4 0.86 1
Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 94.0% $290,782 73.6 1.79 1
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 92.6% $288,093 85.8 1.39 1
Jacksonville, FL 92.6% $181,653 73.2 1.06 1 1
Baltimore-Towson, MD 89.8% $258,936 66.9 1.23 1
Ocala, FL 89.2% $147,002 74.9 1.73 1 1
Newark-Union, NJ-PA 88.6% $381,183 73.0 1.17 1
Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 85.6% $176,563 74.0 1.20 1
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 85.5% $221,630 71.6 0.82 1
Reno-Sparks, NV 84.7% $316,406 80.0 1.39 1
Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 82.9% $141,875 84.9 1.56 1 1
Peabody, MA 81.8% $335,451 68.9 0.86 1
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 81.0% $468,745 74.9 0.98 1
Trenton-Ewing, NJ 80.7% $276,183 67.0 1.88 1
Worcester, MA 80.6% $245,583 66.0 0.86 1
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, WA 77.4% $369,177 66.6 0.88 1
Tucson, AZ 76.5% $198,430 73.7 1.42 1
Cambridge-Newton-Framingham, MA 76.0% $380,977 63.6 0.86 1
58Percent Change Home Fertility Elasticity Coastal Sand
Metropolitan Area Name (2009 MSAD) Prices 97-06 Price 2006 Rate 2006 of Supply MSA MSA
Gainesville, FL 75.6% $169,875 52.6 2.48 1 1
Honolulu, HI 71.7% $589,037 87.9
New Haven-Milford, CT 71.3% $261,064 65.8 0.98 1
Tacoma, WA 71.0% $261,712 73.2 1.21 1
Camden, NJ 70.5% $232,665 69.7 1.65 1
Norwich-New London, CT 68.2% $252,431 61.6 1.46 1
Philadelphia, PA 67.6% $211,020 67.9 1.65 1
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 66.5% $221,112 74.0 1.45
Wilmington, DE-MD-NJ 63.9% $232,676 68.8 1.95 1
Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 61.2% $154,225 73.7 1.48 1 1
Vineland-Millville-Bridgeton, NJ 61.0% $166,452 89.8 1.85 1
Springﬁeld, MA 59.4% $209,209 57.4 1.52
Richmond, VA 58.0% $185,521 69.2 2.60 1
Olympia, WA 57.3% $248,438 66.9 1.75 1
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT 54.2% $238,239 63.0 1.50 1
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA 52.9% $283,856 72.1 1.07
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 52.8% $207,168 67.6 1.77
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 52.8% $187,483 60.3 1.70
Asheville, NC 51.8% $159,848 69.3 1.55
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL 49.7% $251,216 74.0 0.81 1
Denver-Aurora-Broomﬁeld, CO 40.1% $216,292 77.5 1.53
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 38.2% $180,640 71.3 1.03 1
Spokane, WA 37.4% $182,067 71.9 1.64
York-Hanover, PA 36.8% $172,685 68.4 1.99 1
St. Louis, MO-IL 35.9% $136,093 69.3 2.36
Lake County-Kenosha County, IL-WI 35.4% $258,459 75.9 1.00 1
Racine, WI 35.1% $161,554 73.0 1.77 1
Madison, WI 34.0% $201,667 63.0 2.25
Reading, PA 33.9% $166,269 70.5 2.03
Fayetteville-Springdale-Rogers, AR-MO 32.7% $132,146 82.9 2.06
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX 32.7% $157,418 75.6 3.00
Lancaster, PA 31.8% $180,168 84.7 2.24 1
Binghamton, NY 31.7% $107,227 65.2 2.26
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 30.9% $113,243 85.0 2.23 1
Utica-Rome, NY 30.1% $106,208 67.2 2.79 1
Colorado Springs, CO 30.0% $198,587 78.2 1.67
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 29.5% $179,457 76.0 2.55
Midland, TX 28.9% $105,898 89.7
Albuquerque, NM 28.2% $183,194 76.2 2.11
Mobile, AL 27.9% $107,656 74.1 2.04 1
Niles-Benton Harbor, MI 27.8% $127,136 73.9 2.06 1
Kansas City, MO-KS 27.6% $132,024 77.6 3.19
Salt Lake City, UT 27.4% $225,663 97.0 0.75
Lafayette, LA 27.1% $120,141 72.9 4.84 1
Baton Rouge, LA 27.0% $122,634 72.3 1.74 1
Ann Arbor, MI 26.6% $212,388 55.7 2.29 1
Chattanooga, TN-GA 26.4% $119,291 66.3 2.11
Shreveport-Bossier City, LA 25.9% $99,810 74.3
El Paso, TX 25.9% $99,742 95.5 2.35
Knoxville, TN 25.8% $131,259 64.7 1.42
Lexington-Fayette, KY 25.8% $140,213 66.8 2.63
Birmingham-Hoover, AL 24.7% $121,813 72.7 2.14
San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 24.6% $102,182 81.0 2.98
Syracuse, NY 24.5% $116,321 63.5 2.21 1
Corpus Christi, TX 24.1% $94,566 76.4 1.65 1
Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 23.6% $150,613 68.4 1.63
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Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 23.2% $161,298 72.7 2.24
Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 22.9% $109,720 74.0 3.57
Columbia, SC 22.8% $119,656 68.6 2.64
Lansing-East Lansing, MI 22.4% $133,123 58.0 2.58
Scranton–Wilkes-Barre, PA 22.2% $123,566 63.9 1.62
Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI 21.4% $113,685 65.5 1.24 1
Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 20.0% $129,175 80.5 3.66
Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 19.4% $105,763 73.4 4.11
Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 19.4% $171,002 67.9 2.11
Dallas-Plano-Irving, TX 19.1% $124,055 80.2 2.18
Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 19.0% $108,394 74.1 2.79
Louisville/Jeﬀerson County, KY-IN 18.6% $127,502 70.8 2.34
Waco, TX 18.6% $86,859 75.8
Pittsburgh, PA 18.3% $110,200 60.9 1.20
Warren-Troy-Farmington Hills, MI 18.2% $186,579 64.0 1.30 1
Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 18.1% $76,356 79.5 2.49 1
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 16.5% $131,715 77.5 2.39 1
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 16.3% $151,494 77.2 3.09
Omaha-Council Bluﬀs, NE-IA 16.2% $124,335 85.0 3.47
Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 15.7% $127,799 67.0 2.48 1
Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 15.7% $108,505 81.7 2.80
Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 15.6% $105,663 64.7 2.41
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 15.5% $138,971 71.8 2.51
Lubbock, TX 15.0% $83,529 72.7 4.33
Peoria, IL 14.4% $110,385 76.4 3.23
Columbus, OH 13.8% $146,041 73.0 2.71
Rockford, IL 13.8% $123,510 75.5 3.68
Toledo, OH 13.8% $114,567 65.4 2.21 1
Raleigh-Cary, NC 13.7% $178,667 76.2 2.11
Flint, MI 13.6% $108,328 70.2 2.75 1
Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC 13.5% $117,495 72.7 2.71
Gary, IN 13.2% $131,597 72.5 1.74 1
Springﬁeld, MO 13.1% $114,971 71.1 3.60
South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 12.8% $107,023 74.1 4.36 1
Winston-Salem, NC 12.4% $128,671 72.5 3.10
Memphis, TN-MS-AR 11.8% $108,828 75.7 1.76
Wichita, KS 11.6% $96,868 88.7 5.45
Montgomery, AL 11.1% $108,348 70.5 3.58
Ogden-Clearﬁeld, UT 10.9% $179,163 109.0 0.75
Saginaw-Saginaw Township North, MI 10.9% $100,272 66.1 2.23 1
Buﬀalo-Niagara Falls, NY 9.9% $115,101 60.5 1.83 1
Greensboro-High Point, NC 9.8% $122,924 66.1 3.10
Akron, OH 9.0% $132,057 62.6 2.59 1
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 8.7% $140,618 66.6 1.02 1
Canton-Massillon, OH 8.6% $117,865 68.9 3.03
Fayetteville, NC 7.8% $107,010 83.9 2.71
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 7.5% $97,192 64.3 2.59
Rochester, NY 7.3% $117,940 63.9 1.40 1
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 7.0% $130,473 78.3 4.00
Spartanburg, SC 6.8% $100,563 70.5 2.71
Dayton, OH 3.9% $119,761 68.0 3.71
Fort Wayne, IN 3.3% $101,869 81.1 5.36
Springﬁeld, IL 1.2% $105,476 68.5
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